What DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) sets on each scheduled job
Article 24(6) sets at least yearly testing of the systems behind critical or important functions and Article 11 a yearly test of continuity and response plans, both for entities other than microenterprises; Article 19 carries the reporting clocks of the Commission delegated regulation: an initial notification within 4 hours of classifying an incident as major and no later than 24 hours after becoming aware, an intermediate report within 72 hours of it, a final report within one month. Tick DORA on the register and every job in these classes carries its row below. A lit cell is a figure the clause states; a row that reads no clock stays that way, because the register never fills a blank the standard left open.
The clock each rule sets
| Consumer class | Clock | Clause |
|---|---|---|
| Security monitoring and log review | ||
| Security event log review export | no clock | DORA Art. 10 Detectionpromptly |
| Security alert and monitoring report | no clock | DORA Art. 10 Detectionpromptly |
| Backup, restore and replication | ||
| Backup restore test | 8,760h | DORA Art. 24 General requirements for the performance of digital operational resilience testingsystems behind critical or important functions tested at least yearly, entities other than microenterprises |
| 8,760h | DORA Art. 11 Response and recoverycontinuity and response plans tested at least once a year | |
| Full backup | no clock | DORA Art. 12 Backup policies and procedures, restoration and recovery |
| Incremental or differential backup | no clock | DORA Art. 12 Backup policies and procedures, restoration and recovery |
| Database snapshot | no clock | DORA Art. 12 Backup policies and procedures, restoration and recovery |
| Replication and failover sync | no clock | DORA Art. 12 Backup policies and procedures, restoration and recovery |
| Incident and breach reporting | ||
| Breach notification report pack | 24h | DORA Art. 19 Reporting of major ICT-related incidentsinitial notification no later than 24 hours after becoming aware, within 4 hours of classifying it major |
| Incident and service report | no clock | DORA Art. 17 ICT-related incident management process |
| Incident response exercise or drill | 8,760h | DORA Art. 11 Response and recoveryresponse and continuity plans tested at least once a year |
| Regulator incident notification | 24h | DORA Art. 19 Reporting of major ICT-related incidentsinitial notification no later than 24 hours after becoming aware, within 4 hours of classifying it major |
| Customer-facing feeds and statements | ||
| Customer statement and notification feed | no clock | DORA Art. 11 Response and recovery |
| Payment file and settlement batch | no clock | DORA Art. 11 Response and recovery |
| Pricing and rates feed | no clock | DORA Art. 11 Response and recovery |
The clauses in full
Financial entities have mechanisms, aligned with the Article 17 incident process, that promptly detect anomalous activity, network performance problems and ICT-related incidents and flag possible material single points of failure; the mechanisms provide multiple control layers, alert thresholds and criteria that start incident response, automatic alerts to response staff, and are tested regularly under Article 25. Sufficient resources monitor user activity, anomalies and cyber-attacks. Data reporting service providers, where the entity is one, additionally check trade reports for completeness, omissions and obvious errors and ask for re-transmission (Art. 10(4)). Entities listed in Article 16(1) are outside this Article and follow the simplified framework of Article 16 instead.
What an assessor asks to see: Detection tooling configuration showing layered controls, alert thresholds and the criteria that open an incident; Automatic alert routing records to incident response staff; Results of periodic tests of the detection mechanisms; User activity and anomaly monitoring reports. Where it usually falls short: Alert thresholds set once and never tuned or tested
Financial entities other than microenterprises set up, keep and periodically review a robust, comprehensive programme of digital operational resilience testing within the ICT risk management framework, applied proportionately under Article 4(2), to assess incident preparedness, find weaknesses and fix them promptly. For those entities the programme follows a risk-based approach reflecting the evolving ICT risk landscape, specific risks and the criticality of assets and services; tests are run by independent internal or external parties (internal testers need sufficient resources and no conflicts of interest); issues found are prioritised, classified and remedied with internal validation that they are closed; and appropriate tests are run at least yearly on every ICT system and application that supports a critical or important function (Art. 24(3) to (6)). Microenterprises are outside these paragraphs and test under Article 25(3), balancing testing resources and time against urgency, risk type and criticality. Entities identified by their competent authority must add TLPT under Article 26.
What an assessor asks to see: Approved digital operational resilience testing programme with its risk-based rationale (entities other than microenterprises); Tester independence records, including conflict-of-interest checks for internal testers; Issue log from tests with priority, classification, remediation owner and validation of closure; Yearly test schedule and results covering every ICT system and application that supports a critical or important function. Where it usually falls short: Testing done by the team that built or runs the system
Financial entities adopt an ICT business continuity policy within their overall continuity policy and implement it through documented arrangements that keep critical or important functions running, contain and resolve incidents, estimate preliminary impacts, and drive crisis communication and reporting under Articles 14 and 19; they run a business impact analysis, keep ICT response and recovery plans, test, at least once a year and after substantive changes, the continuity and response plans for the systems behind every function, test crisis communication plans, and keep records of activity during disruptions. Entities other than microenterprises additionally have the response and recovery plans reviewed by independent internal audit (Art. 11(3)), include cyber-attack and switchover scenarios in testing (Art. 11(6)), run a crisis management function (Art. 11(7)), and estimate aggregated annual costs and losses of major incidents when the authority asks (Art. 11(10)). Central securities depositories also send continuity test results to the authority (Art. 11(9)). Entities listed in Article 16(1) are outside this Article and follow the simplified framework of Article 16 instead.
What an assessor asks to see: ICT business continuity policy and the business impact analysis it rests on; ICT response and recovery plans with yearly test reports and tests after substantive changes; Crisis communication plan test record and records kept during actual disruptions; Internal audit review of the response and recovery plans, crisis management function terms of reference and cyber-attack and switchover test scenarios (entities other than microenterprises). Where it usually falls short: Plans tested only for critical systems, not for systems supporting all functions
Financial entities document backup policies (scope of data and minimum backup frequency set by criticality or confidentiality) and restoration and recovery procedures, set up backup systems whose activation does not weaken security, and test backup and restoration periodically. When restoring with their own systems they restore onto ICT systems kept separate, both physically and logically, from the source system. Recovery time and recovery point objectives are set per function, and integrity checks and reconciliations follow any recovery. Entities other than microenterprises keep redundant ICT capacity; microenterprises decide on redundancy from their risk profile (Art. 12(4)). Further duties apply only to specific entity types: central counterparties must be able to recover every transaction in progress when the disruption hit, data reporting service providers keep backup and restoration facilities, and central securities depositories keep a geographically distant secondary processing site (Art. 12(3) and (5)). Entities listed in Article 16(1) are outside this Article and follow the simplified framework of Article 16 instead.
What an assessor asks to see: Backup policy stating data scope and minimum backup frequency by criticality; Restoration test reports from periodic backup and recovery tests; Architecture records showing restore environments separated physically and logically from source systems; Recovery time and recovery point objective register per function. Where it usually falls short: Backups never restored in a test
Financial entities report major ICT-related incidents to their single designated competent authority (significant credit institutions report to the national authority, which passes the report to the ECB), using the Article 20 templates, with an alternative channel where a technical problem blocks the initial notification; Member States may also require copies to NIS2 authorities or CSIRTs. Under Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301, Article 5, the clocks are: initial notification as early as possible and within 4 hours of classifying the incident as major, but no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of it (Art. 5(1)(a)); where the incident is classified as major only after that 24-hour point, within 4 hours of classification (Art. 5(2)); intermediate report within 72 hours of submitting the initial notification even if nothing has changed, plus a further updated intermediate report promptly, and at the latest once regular activities are recovered (Art. 5(1)(b)); final report at the latest one month after the intermediate report or, where updates were filed, the latest updated intermediate report (Art. 5(1)(c)). An entity that cannot meet a deadline must tell the authority and give reasons before it expires (Art. 5(3)). A deadline falling on a weekend or bank holiday may move to noon of the next working day (Art. 5(4)), except for initial and intermediate submissions by credit institutions, central counterparties, trading venue operators and NIS2 essential or important entities (Art. 5(5)), and competent authorities may withdraw that relief from other significant or systemic entities (Art. 5(6)). Where a major incident affects the financial interests of clients, they are told without undue delay about it and the mitigation taken (Art. 19(3)). Significant cyber threats may be notified voluntarily. Reporting may be outsourced, but the entity stays responsible (Art. 19(5)).
What an assessor asks to see: Incident record from the incident management tool showing the awareness timestamp and the timestamp of classification as major; Submitted initial notification, intermediate report or reports and final report, each with its submission receipt or portal confirmation from the competent authority; Client notification issued under DORA Article 19(3) where the incident affected the financial interests of clients, with the date sent; Classification decision record applying the criteria and thresholds of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772. Where it usually falls short: Awareness time not captured, so the 24-hour limit cannot be shown
Financial entities shall define, establish and implement an ICT-related incident management process to detect, manage and notify ICT-related incidents, including early warning indicators, procedures to identify/track/log/categorise incidents by priority and severity, roles and responsibilities, and communication plans.
What an assessor asks to see: Documented ICT incident management process with logging, categorisation and roles. Where it usually falls short: No structured incident management process
Requirement text is our own statement of each clause, from the standards published at compliance.theartofservice.com, the same publisher as this register, read against the published text of each standard: our statement of each clause, not the instrument verbatim. Every regime: the index.