Breach notification report pack
The shortest fixed clock in these texts is 24 hours (daily), set by NIS2 Art.23.4.a. Paste one job that feeds this consumer, for example gdpr_breach_report_pack, weekly, and the register reads its period against the clocks below, names the gap in hours, and carries the question for its owner.
Matched on the job name or the consumer column by these words: breach, breach report, notification pack, breach pack, data breach, breach pack. The clocks on this class run from the event, not from a schedule, so the register asks for the drill or exercise job that proves the pack can be produced in time.
The clock each rule sets
| Regime | Clock | Clause |
|---|---|---|
| GDPR | 72h | GDPR Art. 33 Notification of a personal data breach to the supervisory authoritynot later than 72 hours after becoming aware |
| no clock | GDPR Art. 34 Communication of a personal data breach to the data subjectwithout undue delay | |
| CPS 234 | 72h | CPS 234 para 35 Notify APRA of material incidents within 72 hoursno later than 72 hours |
| NIS2 | 24h | NIS2 Art.23.4.a Submit an early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware of a significant incidentan early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware |
| 72h | NIS2 Art.23.4.b Submit an incident notification within 72 hours, with an initial assessment and indicators of compromisean incident notification within 72 hours of becoming aware | |
| 730h | NIS2 Art.23.4.d Submit a final report within one month, and a progress report where the incident is still runninga final report within one month of the notification | |
| no clock | NIS2 Art.23.1 Notify significant incidents to the CSIRT or competent authority, and warn affected service recipientswithout undue delay | |
| HIPAA | no clock | HIPAA 164.308(a)(6)(ii) Response and Reporting (Required) |
| DORA | 24h | DORA Art. 19 Reporting of major ICT-related incidentsinitial notification no later than 24 hours after becoming aware, within 4 hours of classifying it major |
| PCI DSS | no clock | PCI DSS 12.10.1 Incident response plan ready for activation |
Questions this page answers
How often does GDPR require breach notification report pack?
Within 72 hours of the event (not later than 72 hours after becoming aware): GDPR Art. 33, Notification of a personal data breach to the supervisory authority. The text of GDPR Art. 34 (Communication of a personal data breach to the data subject) sets no fixed period: without undue delay. On becoming aware of a personal data breach, notify it to the competent supervisory authority without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after becoming aware, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons; a notification made later than 72 hours must be accompanied by the reasons for the delay. A processor must notify its controller without undue delay after becoming aware of a breach. The notification must at least describe the nature of the breach including, where possible, the categories and approximate number of data subjects and of personal data records concerned, give the name and contact details of the data protection officer or other contact point, describe the likely consequences, and describe the measures taken or proposed including any measures to mitigate adverse effects. Information may be provided in phases where it cannot all be given at once. Document every personal data breach, including the facts, its effects and the remedial action taken, so the supervisory authority can verify compliance with this Article. Where a personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, communicate the breach to the affected data subjects without undue delay, describing in clear and plain language the nature of the breach and giving at least the contact point, the likely consequences and the measures taken or proposed including mitigation. Communication is not required where the controller had implemented appropriate technical and organisational protection measures and applied them to the affected data, in particular measures such as encryption rendering the data unintelligible to anyone unauthorised, where the controller has since taken measures making the high risk no longer likely to materialise, or where individual communication would involve disproportionate effort, in which case a public communication or similar equally effective measure must be made instead. The supervisory authority may require communication or decide that one of the exemptions applies.
How often does APRA CPS 234 require breach notification report pack?
Within 72 hours of the event (no later than 72 hours): CPS 234 para 35, Notify APRA of material incidents within 72 hours. The entity must tell APRA promptly, and at the latest within 72 hours of becoming aware, of any information security incident that either (a) had, or could have had, a material financial or non-financial effect on the entity itself or on the interests of its depositors, policyholders, beneficiaries or other customers (the impact limb), or (b) has already been notified to another regulator in Australia or overseas. A footnote covers incidents not already reported under CPS 231, SPS 231, CPS 232 or SPS 232, and counts domestic government agencies and international regulators as other regulators.
How often does NIS2 Directive require breach notification report pack?
Within 24 hours of the event (an early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware): NIS2 Art.23.4.a, Submit an early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware of a significant incident. Within 72 hours of the event (an incident notification within 72 hours of becoming aware): NIS2 Art.23.4.b, Submit an incident notification within 72 hours, with an initial assessment and indicators of compromise. Within 730 hours of the event (a final report within one month of the notification): NIS2 Art.23.4.d, Submit a final report within one month, and a progress report where the incident is still running. The text of NIS2 Art.23.1 (Notify significant incidents to the CSIRT or competent authority, and warn affected service recipients) sets no fixed period: without undue delay. The first stage of the layered reporting regime falls due without undue delay and in any event within 24 hours of becoming aware of the significant incident. The early warning is deliberately light: where applicable it indicates whether the incident is suspected of being caused by unlawful or malicious acts, and whether it could have cross-border impact. It is not a full assessment and waiting for one is the classic way to miss the deadline. Two operational points decide whether an entity can meet this. First, becoming aware has to be defined and evidenced, because the clock starts there and an entity that cannot say when it knew cannot show it reported in time. Second, submission has to be possible at any hour, since a Friday night detection has the same 24 hours as a Tuesday morning one. The CSIRT or authority is expected to respond within 24 hours where possible, so the channel is two-way. Within 72 hours of becoming aware, the entity updates the early warning and provides an initial assessment of the significant incident covering its severity and impact, together with indicators of compromise where those are available. The 72 hours runs from awareness, not from the early warning, so the two clocks start together. Trust service providers are held to a shorter deadline: for significant incidents affecting the provision of their trust services they must notify within 24 hours. The practical demand here is investigative rather than administrative, since the entity needs enough forensic capability within three days to characterise severity and impact honestly and to extract indicators worth sharing. Producing indicators requires that the telemetry existed before the incident. One month after the 72-hour notification the entity owes a final report containing a detailed description of the incident including its severity and impact, the type of threat or root cause likely to have triggered it, the mitigation measures applied and ongoing, and where applicable the cross-border impact. If the incident is still ongoing when that month expires, the entity provides a progress report at that point and then a final report within one month of finishing its handling of the incident. Root cause is the demanding element: a report that names the immediate technical trigger without reaching the reason the condition existed does not meet the standard, and it is also the element that determines whether the entity learns anything. The mitigation section must distinguish what is already done from what is still in progress. The core reporting duty attaches to any incident with a significant impact on the provision of the entity's services. Article 23(3) fixes the threshold: an incident is significant if it has caused or is capable of causing severe operational disruption of the services or financial loss for the entity, or if it has affected or is capable of affecting other natural or legal persons by causing considerable material or non-material damage. Capable of causing matters, because it brings in near-miss and contained events that could have gone further. Notification goes to the CSIRT or, where the Member State so provides, the competent authority, without undue delay, and must carry whatever lets the recipient determine cross-border impact. Where appropriate the entity must also tell the recipients of its services about significant incidents likely to affect service delivery. The Directive states that notifying does not of itself increase the notifying entity's liability, which removes one common reason for delay.
How often does HIPAA Security Rule require breach notification report pack?
The text of HIPAA 164.308(a)(6)(ii) (Response and Reporting (Required)) sets no fixed period: no period set by the text. Identify and respond to suspected or known incidents, mitigate harmful effects, and document incidents and their outcomes. NIST recommends linkage to HIPAA Breach Notification Rule timelines.
How often does DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) require breach notification report pack?
Within 24 hours of the event (initial notification no later than 24 hours after becoming aware, within 4 hours of classifying it major): DORA Art. 19, Reporting of major ICT-related incidents. Financial entities report major ICT-related incidents to their single designated competent authority (significant credit institutions report to the national authority, which passes the report to the ECB), using the Article 20 templates, with an alternative channel where a technical problem blocks the initial notification; Member States may also require copies to NIS2 authorities or CSIRTs. Under Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301, Article 5, the clocks are: initial notification as early as possible and within 4 hours of classifying the incident as major, but no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of it (Art. 5(1)(a)); where the incident is classified as major only after that 24-hour point, within 4 hours of classification (Art. 5(2)); intermediate report within 72 hours of submitting the initial notification even if nothing has changed, plus a further updated intermediate report promptly, and at the latest once regular activities are recovered (Art. 5(1)(b)); final report at the latest one month after the intermediate report or, where updates were filed, the latest updated intermediate report (Art. 5(1)(c)). An entity that cannot meet a deadline must tell the authority and give reasons before it expires (Art. 5(3)). A deadline falling on a weekend or bank holiday may move to noon of the next working day (Art. 5(4)), except for initial and intermediate submissions by credit institutions, central counterparties, trading venue operators and NIS2 essential or important entities (Art. 5(5)), and competent authorities may withdraw that relief from other significant or systemic entities (Art. 5(6)). Where a major incident affects the financial interests of clients, they are told without undue delay about it and the mitigation taken (Art. 19(3)). Significant cyber threats may be notified voluntarily. Reporting may be outsourced, but the entity stays responsible (Art. 19(5)).
How often does PCI DSS v4.0 require breach notification report pack?
The text of PCI DSS 12.10.1 (Incident response plan ready for activation) sets no fixed period: no period set by the text. An incident response plan must exist and be ready to activate if a security incident is suspected or confirmed. At minimum it covers: roles and duties, plus approaches for communication and for contacting parties, including at least notifying payment brands and acquirers; response procedures giving specific containment and mitigation steps per incident type; procedures for business recovery and continuity; processes for backing up data; an analysis of the legal duties to report compromises; coverage of, and responses covering, every critical system component; and reference to, or inclusion of, the payment brands' incident response procedures. Objective under the customized approach: a thorough incident response plan meeting card brand expectations is kept.
What does the register ask the owner of a breach notification report pack job?
The clock here runs from awareness, not from a schedule. Which exercise or drill job proves the pack can be produced inside it?
The clauses in full
On becoming aware of a personal data breach, notify it to the competent supervisory authority without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after becoming aware, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons; a notification made later than 72 hours must be accompanied by the reasons for the delay. A processor must notify its controller without undue delay after becoming aware of a breach. The notification must at least describe the nature of the breach including, where possible, the categories and approximate number of data subjects and of personal data records concerned, give the name and contact details of the data protection officer or other contact point, describe the likely consequences, and describe the measures taken or proposed including any measures to mitigate adverse effects. Information may be provided in phases where it cannot all be given at once. Document every personal data breach, including the facts, its effects and the remedial action taken, so the supervisory authority can verify compliance with this Article.
What an assessor asks to see: The internal breach register covering all breaches including those assessed as not notifiable, with the risk assessment recorded for each; The awareness timestamp per incident and the basis for it, since the 72 hours runs from awareness and not from confirmation or containment; Notifications as submitted, checked against the four content elements Article 33(3) requires; The methodology used to decide notifiability, and evidence it was applied rather than the decision reached first and documented after. Where it usually falls short: The awareness clock started at the end of the investigation rather than at the point of reasonable certainty that a breach had occurred
Where a personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, communicate the breach to the affected data subjects without undue delay, describing in clear and plain language the nature of the breach and giving at least the contact point, the likely consequences and the measures taken or proposed including mitigation. Communication is not required where the controller had implemented appropriate technical and organisational protection measures and applied them to the affected data, in particular measures such as encryption rendering the data unintelligible to anyone unauthorised, where the controller has since taken measures making the high risk no longer likely to materialise, or where individual communication would involve disproportionate effort, in which case a public communication or similar equally effective measure must be made instead. The supervisory authority may require communication or decide that one of the exemptions applies.
What an assessor asks to see: The high risk assessment per breach, kept distinct from the Article 33 assessment, which uses a lower threshold; The communication as sent, assessed for clear and plain language and for the three content elements required; Where the encryption exemption is relied on, evidence the measure covered the specific affected data and that the keys were not also compromised; Where disproportionate effort is claimed, the public communication actually made and evidence of the reach it achieved. Where it usually falls short: Communication deferred until the investigation completes, when the Article requires it without undue delay once high risk is identified
The entity must tell APRA promptly, and at the latest within 72 hours of becoming aware, of any information security incident that either (a) had, or could have had, a material financial or non-financial effect on the entity itself or on the interests of its depositors, policyholders, beneficiaries or other customers (the impact limb), or (b) has already been notified to another regulator in Australia or overseas. A footnote covers incidents not already reported under CPS 231, SPS 231, CPS 232 or SPS 232, and counts domestic government agencies and international regulators as other regulators.
What an assessor asks to see: Notification procedure stating the 72-hour clock, who decides materiality and who submits to APRA; Materiality assessment criteria and completed assessments per incident; Copies of APRA notifications with timestamps of awareness and submission; Register of notifications to other regulators that triggers APRA notification. Where it usually falls short: Clock started at confirmation of the incident instead of awareness
The first stage of the layered reporting regime falls due without undue delay and in any event within 24 hours of becoming aware of the significant incident. The early warning is deliberately light: where applicable it indicates whether the incident is suspected of being caused by unlawful or malicious acts, and whether it could have cross-border impact. It is not a full assessment and waiting for one is the classic way to miss the deadline. Two operational points decide whether an entity can meet this. First, becoming aware has to be defined and evidenced, because the clock starts there and an entity that cannot say when it knew cannot show it reported in time. Second, submission has to be possible at any hour, since a Friday night detection has the same 24 hours as a Tuesday morning one. The CSIRT or authority is expected to respond within 24 hours where possible, so the channel is two-way.
What an assessor asks to see: The definition of becoming aware and the evidence trail that fixes that moment per incident; Submitted early warnings with timestamps, measured against the 24-hour limit; Out-of-hours submission capability, including named authorised submitters and their credentials; The judgement recorded on suspected unlawful or malicious cause and on cross-border impact. Where it usually falls short: Awareness treated as the moment of executive briefing rather than of qualified detection
Within 72 hours of becoming aware, the entity updates the early warning and provides an initial assessment of the significant incident covering its severity and impact, together with indicators of compromise where those are available. The 72 hours runs from awareness, not from the early warning, so the two clocks start together. Trust service providers are held to a shorter deadline: for significant incidents affecting the provision of their trust services they must notify within 24 hours. The practical demand here is investigative rather than administrative, since the entity needs enough forensic capability within three days to characterise severity and impact honestly and to extract indicators worth sharing. Producing indicators requires that the telemetry existed before the incident.
What an assessor asks to see: Submitted notifications with timestamps measured from the awareness moment; The initial severity and impact assessment as submitted, and the basis for it; Indicators of compromise shared, and the telemetry and tooling they were derived from; Where the entity is a trust service provider, evidence the shorter 24-hour deadline is built into the procedure. Where it usually falls short: 72 hours counted from the early warning rather than from awareness
One month after the 72-hour notification the entity owes a final report containing a detailed description of the incident including its severity and impact, the type of threat or root cause likely to have triggered it, the mitigation measures applied and ongoing, and where applicable the cross-border impact. If the incident is still ongoing when that month expires, the entity provides a progress report at that point and then a final report within one month of finishing its handling of the incident. Root cause is the demanding element: a report that names the immediate technical trigger without reaching the reason the condition existed does not meet the standard, and it is also the element that determines whether the entity learns anything. The mitigation section must distinguish what is already done from what is still in progress.
What an assessor asks to see: Final reports as submitted, with the date measured one month from the notification; Root cause analysis output, reaching the underlying condition rather than the immediate trigger; The mitigation record separating completed measures from ongoing ones, with owners and dates; Cross-border impact assessment where applicable. Where it usually falls short: Root cause given as the exploited vulnerability with no account of why it was exposed
The core reporting duty attaches to any incident with a significant impact on the provision of the entity's services. Article 23(3) fixes the threshold: an incident is significant if it has caused or is capable of causing severe operational disruption of the services or financial loss for the entity, or if it has affected or is capable of affecting other natural or legal persons by causing considerable material or non-material damage. Capable of causing matters, because it brings in near-miss and contained events that could have gone further. Notification goes to the CSIRT or, where the Member State so provides, the competent authority, without undue delay, and must carry whatever lets the recipient determine cross-border impact. Where appropriate the entity must also tell the recipients of its services about significant incidents likely to affect service delivery. The Directive states that notifying does not of itself increase the notifying entity's liability, which removes one common reason for delay.
What an assessor asks to see: The documented significance test, expressed against the Article 23(3) limbs including capable of causing; The determination record for each candidate incident, including reasoned decisions not to report; Notifications as submitted, with timestamps, and the identity of the receiving CSIRT or authority; Cross-border impact information captured and included in the notification. Where it usually falls short: Threshold applied only to realised impact, so contained incidents capable of severe disruption go unreported
Identify and respond to suspected or known incidents, mitigate harmful effects, and document incidents and their outcomes. NIST recommends linkage to HIPAA Breach Notification Rule timelines.
What an assessor asks to see: Incident ticket log; Post-incident reports; Breach risk assessments per 164.402; Notification records (individuals, HHS, media). Where it usually falls short: Incident closure without root cause
Financial entities report major ICT-related incidents to their single designated competent authority (significant credit institutions report to the national authority, which passes the report to the ECB), using the Article 20 templates, with an alternative channel where a technical problem blocks the initial notification; Member States may also require copies to NIS2 authorities or CSIRTs. Under Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301, Article 5, the clocks are: initial notification as early as possible and within 4 hours of classifying the incident as major, but no later than 24 hours after becoming aware of it (Art. 5(1)(a)); where the incident is classified as major only after that 24-hour point, within 4 hours of classification (Art. 5(2)); intermediate report within 72 hours of submitting the initial notification even if nothing has changed, plus a further updated intermediate report promptly, and at the latest once regular activities are recovered (Art. 5(1)(b)); final report at the latest one month after the intermediate report or, where updates were filed, the latest updated intermediate report (Art. 5(1)(c)). An entity that cannot meet a deadline must tell the authority and give reasons before it expires (Art. 5(3)). A deadline falling on a weekend or bank holiday may move to noon of the next working day (Art. 5(4)), except for initial and intermediate submissions by credit institutions, central counterparties, trading venue operators and NIS2 essential or important entities (Art. 5(5)), and competent authorities may withdraw that relief from other significant or systemic entities (Art. 5(6)). Where a major incident affects the financial interests of clients, they are told without undue delay about it and the mitigation taken (Art. 19(3)). Significant cyber threats may be notified voluntarily. Reporting may be outsourced, but the entity stays responsible (Art. 19(5)).
What an assessor asks to see: Incident record from the incident management tool showing the awareness timestamp and the timestamp of classification as major; Submitted initial notification, intermediate report or reports and final report, each with its submission receipt or portal confirmation from the competent authority; Client notification issued under DORA Article 19(3) where the incident affected the financial interests of clients, with the date sent; Classification decision record applying the criteria and thresholds of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1772. Where it usually falls short: Awareness time not captured, so the 24-hour limit cannot be shown
An incident response plan must exist and be ready to activate if a security incident is suspected or confirmed. At minimum it covers: roles and duties, plus approaches for communication and for contacting parties, including at least notifying payment brands and acquirers; response procedures giving specific containment and mitigation steps per incident type; procedures for business recovery and continuity; processes for backing up data; an analysis of the legal duties to report compromises; coverage of, and responses covering, every critical system component; and reference to, or inclusion of, the payment brands' incident response procedures. Objective under the customized approach: a thorough incident response plan meeting card brand expectations is kept.
What an assessor asks to see: Incident response plan with role and contact tables; Payment brand and acquirer notification procedures; Incident-type playbooks with containment and mitigation steps; Legal reporting requirements analysis. Where it usually falls short: Plan lacks payment brand and acquirer notification steps
Requirement text is our own statement of each clause, from the standards published at compliance.theartofservice.com, the same publisher as this register, read against the published text of each standard: our statement of each clause, not the instrument verbatim. Run this job through the register