What PCI DSS v4.0 sets on each scheduled job
Sets the daily log review, the three-month scans, the six-month account review and the annual plan test in figures the published text states. Tick PCI DSS on the register and every job in these classes carries its row below. A lit cell is a figure the clause states; a row that reads no clock stays that way, because the register never fills a blank the standard left open.
The clock each rule sets
| Consumer class | Clock | Clause |
|---|---|---|
| Security monitoring and log review | ||
| Card environment log review | 24h | PCI DSS 10.4.1 Daily review of security-relevant logsreviewed at least daily |
| no clock | PCI DSS 10.4.1.1 Automated mechanisms used for audit log reviewautomated mechanisms | |
| Security event log review export | 24h | PCI DSS 10.4.1 Daily review of security-relevant logssecurity events reviewed at least daily |
| no clock | PCI DSS 10.4.1.1 Automated mechanisms used for audit log reviewautomated mechanisms | |
| Other system log review | no clock | PCI DSS 10.4.2 Periodic review of all other system component logsperiodically |
| no clock | PCI DSS 10.4.2.1 Periodic log review frequency set by targeted risk analysisthe frequency the targeted risk analysis defines | |
| Security alert and monitoring report | no clock | PCI DSS 10.7.2 Detect and alert on critical security control failurespromptly |
| File integrity and change detection | no clock | PCI DSS 10.3.4 File integrity monitoring on audit logsalerts on change to log data |
| Audit log retention and archive | no clock | PCI DSS 10.5.1 Keep logs 12 months, latest three months onlinetwelve months retained, three immediately available; no run period |
| Backup, restore and replication | ||
| Offline media backup and location review | 8,760h | PCI DSS 9.4.1.2 Annual review of offline backup location securitysecurity reviewed at least once every 12 months |
| Incident and breach reporting | ||
| Breach notification report pack | no clock | PCI DSS 12.10.1 Incident response plan ready for activation |
| Incident and service report | no clock | PCI DSS 12.10.1 Incident response plan ready for activation |
| Incident response exercise or drill | 8,760h | PCI DSS 12.10.2 Annual review and testing of the incident response planreviewed at least once every 12 months and tested annually |
| Material control weakness report | no clock | PCI DSS 10.7.2 Detect and alert on critical security control failurespromptly |
| Access and identity reviews | ||
| User access review export | 4,380h | PCI DSS 7.2.4 User accounts and privileges reviewed every six monthsat least once every six months |
| Privileged account review | 4,380h | PCI DSS 7.2.4 User accounts and privileges reviewed every six monthsat least once every six months |
| Credential and password rotation | 2,160h | PCI DSS 8.3.9 Single-factor passwords changed every 90 days or dynamic analysischanged at least every 90 days |
| Regulatory returns and filings | ||
| Compliance attestation and scope confirmation | 8,760h | PCI DSS 12.5.2 Annual and change-driven scope confirmationconfirmed at least once every 12 months |
| Targeted risk analysis review | no clock | PCI DSS 10.4.2.1 Periodic log review frequency set by targeted risk analysisthe frequency the targeted risk analysis defines |
| Vulnerability and patch reporting | ||
| Vulnerability scan export | 2,190h | PCI DSS 11.3.1 Quarterly internal vulnerability scansat least once every three months |
| 2,190h | PCI DSS 11.3.2 Quarterly ASV external vulnerability scansat least once every three months | |
| Patch compliance report | 730h | PCI DSS 6.3.3 Timely installation of security patchescritical patches installed within one month of release; others on the period the risk ranking sets |
| Asset inventory sync | 8,760h | PCI DSS 12.5.2 Annual and change-driven scope confirmationconfirmed at least once every 12 months |
| Board and management reporting | ||
| Audit evidence pack export | no clock | PCI DSS 10.5.1 Keep logs 12 months, latest three months onlinetwelve months retained |
The clauses in full
Every day, at a minimum, the entity must review: all security events; the logs of each critical system component; the logs of each system component that stores, processes or transmits CHD and/or SAD; and the logs of each server and system component with a security function (such as authentication servers, IDS/IPS and network security controls). Applies to all entities. Objective under the customized approach: activity that may be suspicious or anomalous is found fast, keeping its impact low.
What an assessor asks to see: Daily log review procedure naming the four log categories; SIEM dashboards or review tickets showing a review for every calendar day, including weekends and holidays; List of critical system components and security function systems covered by review; Reports or sign-offs from an outsourced SOC, if used. Where it usually falls short: No review evidence for weekends or public holidays
Audit log reviews must be carried out using automated mechanisms. Applies to all entities. The guidance gives log collection, parsing and alerting tools, central log management, event log analyzers and SIEM solutions as examples, and recommends a baseline of normal activity and periodic tuning of tool settings. Objective under the customized approach: a consistent, repeatable mechanism picks up activity that may be suspicious or anomalous. Future-dated: treated as a best practice up to 31 March 2025 and mandatory since then.
What an assessor asks to see: SIEM or log analytics platform description and scope; Correlation rules and use cases configured for suspicious activity; Baseline of normal activity patterns used for detection; Sample automated alerts generated and triaged. Where it usually falls short: Logs centralized but reviewed only by manual searching
Logs from every other in-scope system component, meaning those not covered by the daily review in 10.4.1, must be reviewed on a periodic basis. Applies to all entities. Applicability: covers every remaining in-scope component outside the scope of 10.4.1. The guidance notes these reviews can reveal signs of trouble or attempts to reach critical systems by way of less critical ones. Customized approach objective: suspicious or anomalous activity on these other components is reviewed in line with the risk the entity has identified.
What an assessor asks to see: Procedure defining periodic review for lower-risk in-scope components; Inventory distinguishing 10.4.1 components from other in-scope components; Documented results of periodic reviews with dates and reviewer; Interview notes with personnel performing the reviews. Where it usually falls short: Other in-scope components are logged but never reviewed
The frequency for periodically reviewing logs of every other system component (those outside 10.4.1) must be set by the entity's own targeted risk analysis, and that analysis must be carried out in line with every element specified in Requirement 12.3.1. Applies to all entities. The guidance suggests criteria such as how complex the environment is, how many types of systems need evaluating and what those systems do. Objective under the customized approach: reviews of lower-risk components' logs happen often enough to address the entity's risk. Future-dated: treated as a best practice up to 31 March 2025 and mandatory since then.
What an assessor asks to see: Targeted risk analysis document for periodic log review frequency, meeting 12.3.1; Approval record of the risk analysis and its review date; Log review records demonstrating the chosen frequency is met; Criteria used in the analysis (environment complexity, system types and functions). Where it usually falls short: Review frequency chosen arbitrarily with no documented targeted risk analysis
When a critical security control system fails, the failure must be detected, alerted and addressed promptly, covering at least failures of: IDS/IPS; network security controls; anti-malware; change-detection tools; logical access controls; physical access controls; segmentation controls where used; audit logging mechanisms; mechanisms for reviewing audit logs; and any automated security testing tools in use. Applies to all entities, service providers included. Applicability: takes the place of 10.7.1 from 31 March 2025 and adds two control systems that 10.7.1 did not list (the mechanisms for reviewing audit logs and automated security testing tools). Objective under the customized approach: any failure of a critical security control system is spotted and dealt with promptly. Future-dated: treated as a best practice up to 31 March 2025 and mandatory since then.
What an assessor asks to see: Process document covering failure detection for all ten listed control systems; Health check and heartbeat monitoring configuration, including for the SIEM and log review tooling; Sample alerts showing detection of a control failure (for example firewall offline, agent stopped); Coverage matrix mapping each critical control system to its failure alert. Where it usually falls short: Failure of the SIEM or log review tooling itself is not monitored
Audit logs must be covered by file integrity monitoring or by change-detection tooling so that existing log data cannot be altered without an alert being raised. Applies to all entities. As good practice, the guidance recommends that the tooling alert when stored log content or log files are altered or removed, but not when new entries are appended. Objective under the customized approach: nobody can change the stored records of activity without an alert.
What an assessor asks to see: FIM policy listing audit log files and directories as monitored objects; FIM or change-detection alert samples for modified or deleted log data; Log platform integrity features (hashing, signing) configuration; Evidence alerts are routed to responders. Where it usually falls short: FIM covers system binaries but not log files
Audit log history must be kept for at least 12 months, and at least the latest three months must be ready for immediate analysis. Applies to all entities. The guidance explains that compromises often stay undetected for a long time, and gives storing logs online, archiving them or restoring them quickly from backup as examples of keeping logs immediately available. Customized approach objective: historical activity records can be used straight away to support incident response and are held for at least 12 months.
What an assessor asks to see: Audit log retention policy and procedure stating 12 months and three months online; SIEM hot storage and archive retention settings; Oldest available log entries per sampled source showing 12 months of history; Demonstration of querying or restoring logs from the last three months. Where it usually falls short: SIEM hot tier only keeps 30 or 90 days with no archive beyond
Each location that stores offline backup media holding cardholder data must have its security reviewed at least every 12 months. Applicability: entities with offline backup storage locations. Objective under the customized approach: the security controls guarding offline backups are periodically confirmed through inspection. The guidance explains that regular reviews let the entity address identified security issues promptly and keep the entity aware of how well its media storage area is protected.
What an assessor asks to see: Procedure defining the annual security review of each backup storage location; Completed inspection reports or checklists for each location dated within the last 12 months; Findings and remediation records from those reviews; Vendor assurance report or site visit record for commercial storage facilities. Where it usually falls short: Only the primary vault reviewed while a secondary storage site is overlooked
An incident response plan must exist and be ready to activate if a security incident is suspected or confirmed. At minimum it covers: roles and duties, plus approaches for communication and for contacting parties, including at least notifying payment brands and acquirers; response procedures giving specific containment and mitigation steps per incident type; procedures for business recovery and continuity; processes for backing up data; an analysis of the legal duties to report compromises; coverage of, and responses covering, every critical system component; and reference to, or inclusion of, the payment brands' incident response procedures. Objective under the customized approach: a thorough incident response plan meeting card brand expectations is kept.
What an assessor asks to see: Incident response plan with role and contact tables; Payment brand and acquirer notification procedures; Incident-type playbooks with containment and mitigation steps; Legal reporting requirements analysis. Where it usually falls short: Plan lacks payment brand and acquirer notification steps
On a cycle of no more than 12 months, the entity must review its security incident response plan, updating the content where needed, and must test it, with the test covering every element listed in Requirement 12.10.1. The guidance explains that tests can take the form of simulated incidents or table-top exercises involving relevant personnel, and that reviewing how well the simulated response went helps confirm nothing required is missing from the plan. Customized approach objective: the plan stays current and undergoes periodic testing.
What an assessor asks to see: Annual plan review record and change log; Table-top or simulation exercise report; Exercise participant list; Test coverage map against the 12.10.1 elements. Where it usually falls short: Exercise tested only technical containment and skipped brand notification or legal analysis
All user accounts and their related access privileges, including third-party and vendor accounts, must be reviewed at least every six months. The review must confirm that accounts and access remain appropriate for each person's job function, any inappropriate access must be dealt with, and management must acknowledge that the remaining access is appropriate. The guidance notes the review is also a chance to catch terminated users and third parties whose access was missed. Applicability: covers every user account and related privilege, including accounts of personnel, of vendors and of other third parties and accounts used to reach third-party cloud services; application and system accounts are handled instead by Requirement 7.2.5 (and its sub-requirement) and by 8.6.1 to 8.6.3. Objective under the customized approach: management periodically verifies that account privilege assignments are correct and remediates nonconformities. Future-dated: treated as a best practice up to 31 March 2025 and mandatory since then.
What an assessor asks to see: Semi-annual user access review records for each in-scope system, with review dates; Evidence that inappropriate access found was removed or corrected, such as closed tickets; Management sign-off acknowledging access remains appropriate; Inventory of third-party, vendor and cloud-service accounts included in the review scope. Where it usually falls short: Reviews cover employees but omit vendor accounts and cloud console users
If user access relies on a password or passphrase alone (any single-factor implementation), one of these must hold: the password or passphrase is replaced no less often than every 90 days; or account security posture is assessed dynamically, with access to resources decided automatically and in real time from that assessment. The guidance notes that dynamic analysis may weigh data points such as device integrity, location, access times and resources requested. Applicability: does not apply to in-scope components where MFA is used; not intended for point-of-sale terminal user accounts that are limited to a single card number per transaction. Customer accounts of service providers are excluded, while accounts used by service provider staff are included. Objective under the customized approach: an undetected compromised password or passphrase cannot be used indefinitely.
What an assessor asks to see: Inventory of in-scope systems using password-only authentication; Maximum password age setting of 90 days or less on those systems; Or configuration and decision logs of the dynamic, risk-based access engine; Documentation of which option applies to each system. Where it usually falls short: Password expiry disabled on systems that still rely on passwords alone
The entity must document its PCI DSS scope and confirm it at least once every 12 months, plus whenever the in-scope environment changes significantly. The scoping validation must at minimum: identify all data flows across payment stages (for instance authorisation, capture, settlement, chargebacks, refunds) and every acceptance channel (for instance card-present, card-not-present, e-commerce); update all data-flow diagrams under Requirement 1.2.4; identify every place where account data is held, processed or sent, including places outside the current CDE, applications handling CHD, data transmitted across networks and systems, and backups of files; identify all components in, connected to, or able to affect the CDE; identify all segmentation controls and the environments segmented from the CDE, with justification for out-of-scope environments; identify all third-party connections with CDE access; and confirm all these items are included in scope. Applicability: this is the entity's own confirmation and is separate from, and not replaced by, the assessor's scoping check during the annual assessment. Objective under the customized approach: scope is checked periodically and after significant change through thorough analysis and suitable technical measures.
What an assessor asks to see: Annual scope confirmation report with date and approver; Updated data-flow diagrams by payment stage and channel; Account data location register including backups and out-of-CDE findings; Segmentation control list with out-of-scope justifications. Where it usually falls short: No scope reconfirmation after a significant change such as a new payment channel
Internal vulnerability scans must be run at least every three months. All vulnerabilities ranked high-risk or critical under the entity's risk rankings from Requirement 6.3.1 must be resolved, and rescans must be run to confirm that every such high-risk and critical finding is fixed. The scanning tool must be kept current with the latest vulnerability information, and the people running scans must be qualified and organizationally independent of what they scan. Guidance (good practice): several scan reports may be combined to show full coverage within the three-month cycle, and scanning more often than quarterly is recommended where the environment warrants it. Applicability: a QSA or ASV is not needed for internal scans; qualified internal staff reasonably independent of the scanned components (for example, not the administrator of that network) may run them, or a specialist scanning firm may be used. Objective under the customized approach: automated tools that detect vulnerabilities inside the network periodically verify the security state of every system component, and findings are assessed and fixed using a formal risk assessment framework.
What an assessor asks to see: Four quarters of internal scan reports covering all in-scope system components; Rescan reports showing high-risk and critical findings closed; Scan tool plugin or signature update logs; Vulnerability risk ranking criteria from Requirement 6.3.1. Where it usually falls short: A quarter missed or the scan scope omitted some CDE segments
External vulnerability scans must meet these conditions: they run at least every three months; an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) listed by the PCI SSC performs them; with vulnerabilities resolved and the ASV Program Guide conditions for a passing scan met; and with rescans run as needed to confirm resolution under those passing-scan conditions. Applicability: for the first PCI DSS assessment against this requirement, four passing scans within 12 months are not required if the assessor confirms (1) the latest scan passed, (2) documented policies and procedures mandate quarterly scanning, meaning at least every three months, plus (3) rescans show the reported vulnerabilities were fixed. From the second year onward, a passing scan is needed for every three-month period. Details of the target environment (load balancers, third parties, ISPs, configurations, protocols, scan interference) are for the ASV and the scan customer to settle between them, with the ASV Program Guide describing scan customer responsibilities. Customized approach objective: not eligible for the customized approach.
What an assessor asks to see: Four quarterly passing ASV scan reports with attestation of scan compliance; Rescan reports demonstrating failed items were fixed; Evidence the ASV is on the PCI SSC approved list; External IP and domain scope list agreed with the ASV. Where it usually falls short: A quarter with only a failing scan and no passing rescan
All system components must be shielded from known vulnerabilities by applying relevant security patches or updates such that: patches or updates addressing critical vulnerabilities, as ranked under Requirement 6.3.1, must go in within one month of their release; and every other relevant security patch or update is installed within a suitable time frame set by the entity's own assessment of how critical the risk is to its environment, using the Requirement 6.3.1 ranking process. It applies to all entities and all system components. Customized approach objective: exploitation of a known vulnerability cannot be used to compromise system components.
What an assessor asks to see: Patch management procedure stating the one-month deadline for critical patches and time frames for others; Patch compliance reports per system component showing install dates against vendor release dates; Risk-based rationale or targeted risk analysis for non-critical patch time frames; Exception register for patches that could not be applied, with compensating measures. Where it usually falls short: Critical patches applied more than one month after release because of change freeze windows
Requirement text is our own statement of each clause, from the standards published at compliance.theartofservice.com, the same publisher as this register, read against the published text of each standard: our statement of each clause, not the instrument verbatim. Every regime: the index.